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Should government employees ever have a right to disseminate 
classified national security information to the public?  As a general 
matter, of course, the answer is “no.”  It is necessarily tautological that 
the central purpose of classifying information is to keep that 
information secret.1  But what if the information pertains to what we 
 *  Associate Professor, American University, Washington College of Law.  This Essay 
is derived from remarks given at the American University Law Review’s September 2007 
Symposium, “Left Out in the Cold?  The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the 
Press in Post-9/11 America.”  I am grateful to Jasmine Watson, Megan Romigh, and 
the staff of the American University Law Review for inviting me to participate in such an 
important conference, and to my co-panelists—Valerie Caproni, Mike German, and 
Colleen Rowley—for sharing their own (far more sophisticated) perspectives on the 
role of governmental whistleblowers today. 
 1. See, e.g., SISSELA BOK, SECRETS:  ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND 
REVELATION 174 (1983) (arguing that some documents should remain secret such as 
government personnel files and tentative inter-agency memorandums circulated in 
order to formulate new policy); ARVIN S. QUIST, 1 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF 
INFORMATION (rev. 2002), http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/quist/index.html 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1315344
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might describe as “unlawful secrets,”2 and the individual in question 
has exhausted all possible non-public remedies—and to no avail?  Are 
there any circumstances in which the law enables the government 
employee to come forward?3  Should there be? 
These questions are hardly academic.  Any list of the most 
important news stories of the past five years would likely include at 
least a handful of reports resulting from national security leaks 
and/or “whistleblowing” by federal government employees.  Take the 
disclosures of the National Security Agency (“NSA”) wiretapping 
program4 and the existence of “black sites,”5 just to name two.  And 
although some critics have publicly called for the prosecution of 
those responsible for the leaks,6 the continuing national debate over 
these controversial initiatives suggests, at bottom, that these programs 
were (and remain) a matter of enormous public concern—at least, 
once they became public.7  Ultimately, then, and regardless of the 
merits of each individual case, it should go without saying that the 
legal landscape governing the potential liability of the 
(providing an overview of numerous classification policies); see also United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (“Secrecy in respect of 
information gathered . . . may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it 
productive of harmful results.”). 
 2. I use this term as shorthand for the two different types of illegally classified 
information:  information that is “secretly unlawful,” i.e., secret information about 
unlawful governmental programs and activities; and information that is “unlawfully 
secret,” i.e., secret information that was improperly classified in the first place.  For 
the currently applicable limitations on classification, see Exec. Order No. 13,292 
§ 1.7, 3 C.F.R. 196, 200 (2004), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435 (Supp. II 2002). 
 3. For a discussion of our increasing tolerance of leaks (as part of a far more 
exhaustive analysis of some of the topics discussed herein), see William E. Lee, Deep 
Background:  Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1453 (2008). 
 4. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
 5. See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 
2005, at A1. 
 6. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Justice Dept. Investigating Leak of NSA Wiretapping, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 31, 2005, at A1; Scott Shane, Criminal Inquiry Opens into Leak in 
Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2005, at A1.  The Times story recounted a 
statement by Vice President Cheney at a press conference that the newspaper’s 
decision to publish the information “damages national security.” Shane, supra; see also 
Editorial, The Press and Mr. Bush, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 27, 2006, at B6 
(quoting a statement by Republican Congressman Peter King of New York that the 
disclosures were “treasonous,” and should lead to criminal prosecutions). 
 7. For a pointed defense of the government employee behind the leak of the 
NSA wiretapping program, see Jesselyn Radack, A Legal Defense of Russell Tice, the 
Whistleblower Who Revealed the President’s Authorization of NSA’s Warrantless Domestic 
Wiretapping, FINDLAW.COM’S WRIT, Jan. 27, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ 
commentary/20060127_radack.html. 
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leakers/whistleblowers—and of those journalists involved in 
reporting their stories—merits further illumination.8
Although a number of scholars (and I) have written about the 
potential liability of the journalists in these cases,9 the question of 
what rights (if any) the relevant governmental employees might have 
has been largely neglected.10  In this short Essay, I offer a few 
thoughts on the relevant legal considerations governing national 
security whistleblowing (and whistleblowers) today. 
As this Essay suggests, because of the broad language of the 
Espionage Act11 and the narrow language of certain whistleblower 
laws,12 a government employee would enjoy no statutory 
whistleblower protection whatsoever from either an adverse 
employment action or a criminal prosecution for disclosing classified 
national security information.13  And because of the Supreme Court’s 
pronounced constriction of the First Amendment rights of public 
employees two years ago in Garcetti v. Ceballos,14 in which the Court 
effectively abandoned the idea of “Pickering balancing”15 for speech 
 8. For a general overview of the history of national security whistleblowing, see 
generally LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NATIONAL SECURITY WHISTLEBLOWERS 
1–43 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33215.pdf. 
 9. See, e.g., Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 927 (1992); Laura Barandes, Note, A Helping Hand:  Addressing the New 
Implications of the Espionage Act on Freedom of the Press, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 371 (2007); 
Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505 
(1974); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act:  The Statutory 
Framework and the Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 219 (2007). 
 10. For the one apparent counterexample, see Jamie Sasser, Comment, Silenced 
Citizens:  The Post-Garcetti Landscape for Public Sector Employees Working in National 
Security, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 759 (2007).  Curiously, Sasser’s otherwise thorough 
analysis completely overlooks the important role the Espionage Act plays in vitiating 
any statutory whistleblower protections that would otherwise be available, an 
important part of the puzzle that I discuss in Part II. 
 11. Espionage Act of 1917, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–799 (2000). 
 12. The specific whistleblower statutes considered herein are the Federal 
Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1222 (2000 & Supp. II 2002), the 
Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, 5 U.S.C. app. § 8H 
(Supp. II 2002), and the Military Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1034 
(West 2008).   
 13. Throughout this Essay, I assume for convenience that the relevant legal 
considerations—or, at bottom, the relevant constitutional protections—are effectively 
identical with respect to their applicability to adverse employment action and to 
criminal prosecutions. 
 14. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). Although the plaintiff in the case (and thus the 
uncommon party) was Richard Ceballos, the case is generally referred to as “Garcetti,” 
a convention I follow throughout. 
 15. See Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (balancing the 
government employee’s interests as a citizen in commenting upon “matters of public 
concern” and the State’s interests as an employer in fostering efficient public 
services). 
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performed by a public employee as part of his professional duties, the 
employee would not be entitled to a constitutional defense, either.16
Reasonable minds can certainly disagree about whether there 
should ever be circumstances where federal law entitles a government 
employee in possession of classified information about illegal 
governmental activity to publicly disclose that information, even as a 
last resort.  The purpose of this Essay is not to offer an argument for 
or against such a right; rather, my goal is to suggest that federal law 
today includes absolutely zero protection for employees in such a 
position, and that, perhaps unintentionally, Garcetti is the reason 
why.17
I begin in Part I with the Espionage Act and the various potentially 
applicable federal whistleblower statutes.  As Part I demonstrates, 
even where they apply, virtually all of the relevant statutory 
whistleblower protections turn on the requirement that the 
disclosure itself not be illegal.  The Espionage Act, however, includes 
a broad and sweeping prohibition of the dissemination of classified 
national security information “to any person not entitled to receive 
it.”18  Thus, because it appears that there can never be a “legal” public 
disclosure of classified national security information under the 
Espionage Act, it also appears that there is no statutory whistleblower 
protection for such disclosures. 
That result, of course, should not be surprising.  What is perhaps 
more troubling is the constitutional question, to which I turn in Part 
II:  Does the First Amendment ever provide a defense to adverse 
employment actions—or even criminal prosecution—based upon the 
disclosure of classified national security information?  As Part II 
explains, the answer before Garcetti (under Pickering and its progeny) 
was “yes, albeit extremely rarely.”19  Garcetti, however, adopted an 
effectively categorical rule that the First Amendment does not protect 
public employee speech “that owes its existence to a public 
 16. On the more general question of Pickering’s relevance and applicability post-
Garcetti, see Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights of 
Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).  See also The Supreme 
Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 125, 273 (2006) (discussing 
Garcetti). 
 17. As I note in Part II, the majority in Garcetti relied on the existence of statutory 
whistleblower protection to bolster their conclusion that constitutional protection 
was not just unwarranted, but unnecessary.  But the majority did not consider those 
contexts, such as national security, where statutory whistleblower protections are, to 
put it mildly, far less robust. 
 18. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)–(e) (2000). 
 19. Or, as Justice Stevens put it, “Sometimes.”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
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employee’s professional responsibilities.”20  Because the disclosure of 
classified national security information would undoubtedly constitute 
speech that could not have existed but for the “public employee’s 
professional responsibilities,” Garcetti, as Part II concludes, necessarily 
vitiates any possible First Amendment protection for national security 
whistleblowers. 
Finally, in Part III, I turn to perhaps the hardest question:  Is the 
problem identified in Parts I and II worth a solution?  There are 
several powerful counterarguments to the need for any statutory or 
constitutional protection for public national security whistleblowing.  
First is the possibility of internal, non-public whistleblowing via 
disclosures to the various Inspectors General or the Special Counsel, 
something for which the Federal Whistleblower Protection Act 
expressly provides21—and which, at least arguably, does not violate 
the Espionage Act.  Second is the possibility of disclosure to Congress 
(or, at least, to the intelligence committees thereof), something for 
which the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act 
(“ICWPA”) expressly provides22—and which, again, at least arguably 
does not violate the Espionage Act. 
As Part III concludes, these other protections take care of many 
cases where we might otherwise want to allow for the public 
disclosure of classified national security information, but not all.  
After all, internal whistleblowing may not be enough when the 
relevant program has been approved at the highest levels of the 
Executive Branch, or when there are other reasons to doubt the 
impartiality of the relevant Inspector General or the Special Counsel. 
And disclosure to the House and Senate intelligence committees is 
a feasible option only if those committees have the authority to act 
upon the information they receive—a point that recent events 
suggest is very much debatable.  In whatever cases remain, the 
Espionage Act, read together with Garcetti, effectively guarantees that 
a government employee will be liable for the disclosure of classified 
national security information. Whether we ultimately want the 
employee in that situation to have to make the moral (as opposed to 
legal) choice, it is understandable why such a legal regime would give 
pause to even the most altruistic and well-intentioned 
whistleblowers.23  And that may be the problem in and of itself. 
 20. Id. at 421 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). 
 21. 5 U.S.C. § 1213(a)(2) (Supp. II 2002). 
 22. 5 U.S.C. app. § 8H (Supp. II 2002). 
 23. See Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, Ceballos and Public Speech:  
Response to Roosevelt, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/06/ceballos-and-public-
speech-response-to.html (June 1, 2006, 11:34 EST). 
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 I.  THE ESPIONAGE ACT AND STATUTORY WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROTECTION 
Section 1(d) of the Espionage Act,24 which was trifurcated into 
present-day 18 U.S.C. § 793(d), (e), and (f) in 1950,25 is the principal 
statutory bar to the willful26 dissemination of classified national 
security information—defined by the statute as 
any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, 
photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, 
instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or 
information relating to the national defense which information the 
possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the 
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.27
Although § 793(e) proscribes the dissemination of such 
information by individuals in the unauthorized possession thereof, 
and is therefore of more significance vis-à-vis the potential liability of 
third parties (including the press),28 § 793(d) likewise prohibits the 
dissemination of such information by individuals in lawful possession 
thereof. Thus, § 793(d) prohibits government employees lawfully in 
possession of “information relating to the national defense which 
information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the 
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation” 
from disclosing that information “to any person not entitled to 
receive it.”29
Section 793(d) is hardly unique.  A host of other overlapping 
statutes arguably prohibit variants of the same conduct at the core of 
§ 793(d)—the dissemination of classified national security 
information.30  But more important than an exhaustive recounting of 
these provisions, is the basic idea at their core:  whether one is in 
lawful possession of classified national security information or not, it 
 24. For what remains the definitive academic survey of the Espionage Act (along 
with other statutes relating to the publication of classified national security 
information), see generally Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage 
Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1973).  See also 
Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home:  Executive Power 
and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349 (1986) (updating their 
earlier analysis). 
 25. The three provisions were modified and separated by the Subversive Activities 
Control Act, part of the Internal Security Act of 1950, tit. I, § 18, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 
64 Stat. 987, 1003 (1950). 
 26. 18 U.S.C. § 793(f) (2000) also prohibits negligence that leads to the loss 
and/or theft of classified national security information, an issue not relevant here. 
 27. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) (2002). 
 28. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 9, at 223–24 (discussing § 793(e) and the issue of 
third-party liability). 
 29. 18 U.S.C. § 793(d). 
 30. See generally Vladeck, supra note 9 (surveying the relevant statutes). 
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is against the law to disclose that information “to any person not 
entitled to receive it,”31 a phrase that has been interpreted 
expansively.32
The significance of the Espionage Act’s preclusion of the 
disclosure of national security information “to any person not 
entitled to receive it” quickly becomes apparent in perusing the 
relevant federal whistleblower protection statutes.  For example, the 
Federal Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPA”),33 protects the public 
disclosure of “a violation of any law, rule, or regulation” only “if such 
disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such information 
is not specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the 
interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.”34  
Indeed, even without the Espionage Act, the WPA would not protect 
the public disclosure of national security information so long as the 
information was classified under an executive order. 
Similar language appears in virtually all of the other federal 
whistleblower protection statutes.35  Thus, unsurprisingly, there is no 
statutory bar to adverse employment action—or even potential 
criminal prosecution—for the unauthorized disclosure of classified 
national security information.  The only true statutory whistleblower 
protection in such cases are the internal disclosures provided for by 
the WPA and the disclosures to Congress provided for by the ICWPA, 
to which I return in Part III. 
II. GARCETTI, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
In 1968, the Supreme Court first identified limited circumstances 
where a public employee’s speech as a public employee would be 
entitled to First Amendment protection.36  As Justice Marshall wrote 
for the majority in Pickering v. Board of Education,37 “The problem in 
any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [public 
employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting 
 31. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 793(d).  Similar language appears in § 793(e). 
 32. See, e.g., United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1064–70 (4th Cir. 1988) 
(recounting exhaustively the history of § 793(d) and concluding that it applies to—
and prohibits—any public disclosures, including disclosures to the press). 
 33. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1222 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
 34. Id. § 1213(a) (emphasis added). 
 35. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2303(b)(8)(A) (2000); 10 U.S.C. § 1587(b)(1) (2000); 22 
U.S.C. § 3905(b)(2) (2000). 
 36. See Leading Cases, supra note 16, at 273.  As the case note describes, “From the 
end of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century, the Court 
considered government employment not a right but a privilege.”  Id. at 273 n.2. 
 37. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
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the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.”38
Such “Pickering balancing” necessarily presupposed that there could 
be cases—such as Pickering itself—where the public interest in the 
government employee’s speech outweighed the government’s 
interest in maintaining the confidentiality of governmental 
information and in promoting the efficiency of internal operations.  
Thus, as a unanimous Court summarized in 2004 in City of San Diego 
v. Roe39: 
 Underlying the decision in Pickering is the recognition that 
public employees are often the members of the community who 
are likely to have informed opinions as to the operations of their 
public employers, operations which are of substantial concern to 
the public.  Were they not able to speak on these matters, the 
community would be deprived of informed opinions on important 
public issues.  The interest at stake is as much the public’s interest 
in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee’s own right to 
disseminate it. 
 Pickering did not hold that any and all statements by a public 
employee are entitled to balancing.  To require Pickering balancing 
in every case where speech by a public employee is at issue, no 
matter the content of the speech, could compromise the proper 
functioning of government offices.  This concern prompted the 
Court in Connick [v. Meyers] to explain a threshold inquiry (implicit 
in Pickering itself) that in order to merit Pickering balancing, a 
public employee’s speech must touch on a matter of “public 
concern.”40
Although Connick and the Court’s other post-Pickering cases did 
little to elaborate on the definition of “public concern,” Roe defined 
“public concern” as “something that is a subject of legitimate news 
interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern 
to the public at the time of publication.”41  Under that definition, it 
stands to reason that various of the more important national security 
“leaks” and/or whistleblowing since September 11 would easily 
constitute “matters of public concern.”  That conclusion does not 
necessarily compel the result that such speech is entitled to First 
 38. Id. at 568.  The Court made clear shortly thereafter that Pickering’s 
understanding of the First Amendment rights of local and state governmental 
employees applied equally to federal employees.  See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 
160–61 (1974) (plurality opinion). 
 39. 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam). 
 40. Id. at 82–83 (internal citations omitted).  See generally Connick v. Myers, 461 
U.S. 138 (1983). 
 41. 543 U.S. at 83–84. 
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Amendment protection, but it would be sufficient to trigger Pickering 
balancing.  Or, at least, it would have been before Garcetti. 
At issue in Garcetti was a memorandum written by Richard Ceballos 
while serving as a deputy district attorney in Los Angeles.  Ceballos 
argued that the memo concerned a matter of public concern and 
that, under Pickering balancing, it was protected by the First 
Amendment.42  The Ninth Circuit agreed on both counts, concluding 
that the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office “failed even to suggest 
disruption or inefficiency in the workings of the District Attorney’s 
Office” resulting from the public disclosure of Ceballos’s memo.43
Specially concurring, Judge O’Scannlain agreed that prior Ninth 
Circuit precedent compelled the result reached by Judge Reinhardt’s 
majority opinion, but questioned whether the time had come to 
revisit the earlier case—Roth v. Veterans Administration.44  In his words, 
While the court quite properly applies Roth as binding precedent in 
this case, the time has come for us to reappraise our jurisprudence 
concerning the free speech rights of the publicly-employed and the 
scope of legitimate governmental regulation in its capacity as 
employer.  Because Roth is inconsistent with Connick’s careful 
differentiation between public employees’ speech as citizens and 
speech in their role as employees, I believe that Roth should be 
overruled—if not by our court sitting en banc, then, in due course, 
by the Supreme Court, to steer this court’s drifting First 
Amendment jurisprudence back to its proper moorings.45
The Supreme Court took up Judge O’Scannlain’s invitation, 
holding that Ceballos’s memo was not subject to Pickering balancing 
and was therefore not protected by the First Amendment.46  Writing 
for a 5-4 majority, Justice Kennedy emphasized that “[t]he controlling 
factor in Ceballos’ case is that [the memorandum was] made 
pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy.”47  Thus, “[w]e hold that 
when public employees make statements pursuant to their official 
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.”48  In other words, 
 42. See Ceballos v. Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410, 416 (2006) (citing the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, holding that the memo “was ‘inherently a matter of public 
concern’”) (citation omitted). 
 43. See Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 U.S. 
410; see also Leading Cases, supra note 16, at 274–75 (summarizing the background). 
 44. Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1185 (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring) (citing Roth 
v. Veterans Admin., 856 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424. 
 47. Id. at 421. 
 48. Id. 
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because Ceballos wrote the memo at issue for his job—that is, because 
the speech at issue was itself conducted in furtherance of his job 
responsibilities—the memo was not entitled to First Amendment 
protection.  So construed, Garcetti contemplated a narrow exception 
to Pickering balancing in those cases where the speech at issue was 
performed by a public employee as a public employee. 
But the Garcetti Court went further, and concluded that 
“[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s 
professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the 
employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”49  In other words, 
the rule Garcetti enunciated did not just apply to speech performed as 
a government employee, but to all speech that “owes its existence to a 
public employee’s professional responsibilities”—a per se “but-for” 
rule that denies First Amendment protection to any speech by a 
public employee that could not have been undertaken but for his or 
her “professional responsibilities.”50  Thus, instead of limiting itself to 
speech performed as part of a government employee’s responsibilities, 
Garcetti also appears to preclude First Amendment protections for any 
speech made by a government employee that would not have been 
possible if he were not a government employee, even if the speech 
itself is not made as part of the employee’s official duties. 
Where classified national security information is concerned, the 
stopping point of this logic is immediately clear:  National security 
secrets are, by definition, information to which the average private 
citizen does not have access.  Speech related to national security 
secrets, then, would seem to fall squarely within the category of 
speech Justice Kennedy identified in Garcetti as falling outside the 
First Amendment’s umbrella.  And whatever the merits of such a 
 49. Id. at 421–22 (emphasis added). 
 50. One of the more thoughtful analyses of Garcetti’s implications suggests that 
the real focus of post-Garcetti courts will be on the true scope of a government 
employee’s “job duties.”  See Sasser, supra note 10, at 768–79.  But the language 
quoted above suggests that the rule enunciated in Garcetti is far broader than speech 
conducted as part of an employee’s “job duties,” and that it actually includes all 
speech that the employee is only able to make by virtue of their governmental 
employment, whether it is part of their professional responsibilities—such as the 
memo prepared by Ceballos—or not.
Finally, it bears noting that the en banc D.C. Circuit has recently held that the 
disclosure or publication of information of significant public concern is not 
protected by the First Amendment if the disclosure or publication is made with 
knowledge that it was unlawfully obtained or leaked.  See Boehner v. McDermott, 484 
F.3d 573, 580–81 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 712 (2007).  Thus, even 
if Garcetti could be read more narrowly to preclude First Amendment protection only 
when the speech at issue was itself made as part of a government employee’s official 
duties, the D.C. Circuit’s decision seems to preclude First Amendment protection for 
any and all unlawful leaks, whether covered by Garcetti or not. 
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rule,51 its implications were readily understood by the dissenting 
Justices, each of whom wrote separately to emphasize the implications 
of the majority’s categorical departure from Pickering balancing.52  
Ultimately, Garcetti seems to stand for the unequivocal proposition 
that, where the government employee is engaging in speech that is 
only made possible by his governmental employment, that speech is 
unprotected by the First Amendment. 
In response to the dissents, Justice Kennedy conceded that 
“[e]xposing governmental inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of 
considerable significance.”53  He nevertheless concluded that such an 
interest could be adequately vindicated without First Amendment 
protection: 
The dictates of sound judgment are reinforced by the powerful 
network of legislative enactments—such as whistle-blower 
protection laws and labor codes—available to those who seek to 
expose wrongdoing . . . .  These imperatives, as well as obligations 
arising from any other applicable constitutional provisions and 
mandates of the criminal and civil laws, protect employees and 
provide checks on supervisors who would order unlawful or 
otherwise inappropriate actions.54
Thus, the crux of the majority’s defense of its evisceration of First 
Amendment protections for government employee speech was the 
availability of whistleblower (and other statutory) protection to shield 
the employee from sanctions. 
In his dissent, Justice Souter took substantial issue with Justice 
Kennedy’s rosy characterization of the availability of whistleblower 
protection.  In his words, “[I]ndividuals doing the same sorts of 
governmental jobs and saying the same sorts of things addressed to 
civic concerns will get different protection depending on the local, 
state, or federal jurisdictions that happened to employ them.”55  To 
rely upon such an incomplete and varying scheme of state and 
federal laws and regulations would, from Souter’s perspective, 
 51. I, for one, agree with one student commentator, who noted that, “[a]lthough 
Garcetti aimed to provide clarity and limit judicial interference in government 
operations, the rule that the Court established is troubling because it deviates from 
precedent in ways that may thwart the interests of the individual speaker, the public, 
and the state employer.”  Leading Cases, supra note 16, at 277. 
 52. See, e.g., Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426–27 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 
427–44 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 444–50 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 53. Id. at 425 (majority opinion). 
 54. Id. at 425–26 (citations omitted). 
 55. Id. at 441 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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undermine the speech interests that Pickering and its progeny 
identified.56
Ultimately, regardless of who has the better argument about the 
viability of whistleblower protections in general,57 the salient question 
here is the availability of such protections to federal employees in 
possession of classified national security information.  As Part I 
suggested, the relevant statutes provide no protection for public 
disclosure of such information, no matter how illegal the 
governmental conduct is or how grave the potential public concern.  
The only remaining question, then, is whether the provisions for non-
public disclosure are sufficient.  It is to that question that this Essay 
now turns. 
III. NON-PUBLIC FEDERAL WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS 
As identified above, the Garcetti Court’s analysis of the First 
Amendment suggests that potential whistleblowers must look to state 
and federal statutes—and not to the Constitution—to find any 
protection for their decision to disclose internal governmental 
information.  Because of the interaction between the Espionage Act 
and the various federal whistleblower protection laws identified in 
Part I, federal employees in possession of classified national security 
information are, at best, left with one of two possible options:  
disclosure to the relevant Inspector General or Special Counsel, 
under the terms of the Federal Whistleblower Protection Act;58 or 
disclosure to particular members of Congress, under the terms of the 
Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998.59
With respect to the WPA, the first serious issue is easy enough to 
describe:  Most government employees who might lawfully be in 
possession of classified national security information are not even 
covered by the WPA, which expressly excludes from its scope 
employees of “the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National 
Imagery and Mapping Agency, the National Security Agency, and, as 
determined by the President, any Executive agency or unit thereof 
 56. Id.; see also id. at 439–41 (summarizing the myriad of incongruities and 
disparities between various state and federal whistleblower protections). 
 57. A separate critique of Kennedy’s analysis, also noted by Justice Souter, is the 
canon that “[t]he applicability of a provision of the Constitution has never depended 
on the vagaries of state or federal law.”  Id. at 439 (quoting Bd. of County Comm’rs, 
Wabaunsee County v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 680 (1996)).  Souter’s point, put 
differently, is that the possible availability of statutory relief should not be the basis for 
categorically precluding a previously available constitutional claim. 
 58. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1220 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
 59. 5 U.S.C. app. § 8H (2000). 
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the principal function of which is the conduct of foreign intelligence 
or counterintelligence activities.”60  Thus, for the vast majority of 
federal employees in possession of classified national security 
information, the WPA is simply inapplicable. 
Second, even for those few employees who might fall within the 
WPA’s umbrella,61 its provisions for internal reporting are somewhat 
convoluted.  As an oversimplification, the WPA authorizes disclosures 
“to the Special Counsel or to the Inspector General of an agency or 
another employee designated by the head of the agency to receive 
such disclosures of information,” without the limitations placed upon 
the public disclosure of similar information.62  Thus, where the 
employee is not excluded from the WPA’s coverage, the Act itself 
places no limit on whether classified national security information 
can be disclosed to the Special Counsel or Inspector General. 
Moreover, the fact that the WPA explicitly authorizes the Special 
Counsel or Inspector General to receive such information is probably 
sufficient to vitiate the Espionage Act’s prohibition on the disclosure 
of classified national security information to anyone “not entitled to 
receive it.”63  Under the WPA, the Special Counsel or Inspector 
General is “entitled to receive” such information, so long as it 
pertains to “a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or . . . gross 
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a 
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.”64
The harder question is what happens next?  According to 5 U.S.C. 
§ 1213(j), 
With respect to any disclosure of information described in 
subsection (a) which involves foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence information, if the disclosure is specifically 
prohibited by law or by Executive order, the Special Counsel shall 
transmit such information to the National Security Advisor, the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate.65
 60. 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) (2007); see also Sasser, supra note 10, at 780–81 
& nn.127–34 (noting the implications of this exception).  As Sasser notes, although 
the WPA excludes the FBI, another section of the WPA, combined with regulations 
implemented thereunder, serve to effectively cover the FBI.  See Sasser, supra note 10, 
at 780 n.127 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 2303(a) (2000) and 28 C.F.R. § 27.1 (2006)). 
 61. See Sasser, supra note 10, at 781–72. 
 62. 5 U.S.C. § 1213(a)(2) (Supp. II 2002). 
 63. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) (2000).  Similar language appears in § 793(e). 
 64. 5 U.S.C. § 1213(a)(2)(A)–(B). 
 65. 5 U.S.C. § 1213(j). 
  
1544 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1531 
                                                          
In other words, if the information at issue relates to foreign 
intelligence or counterintelligence information, the Inspector 
General may only pass along the information to the National Security 
Advisor and certain members of Congress. 
Relatedly, and perhaps most importantly, there is the practical 
problem posed by cases where disclosure to the Inspector General or 
Special Counsel might prove unproductive. This problem could 
occur in cases where the “unlawful secret” has been approved at the 
highest levels of the federal government—as we now know to have 
been true with respect to the wiretapping program.  It could also 
occur in cases where the Inspector General is failing to perform his 
statutory responsibilities, a charge that is not as unrealistic as we 
might previously have hoped.66
All of this is not to say that disclosure to the Inspector General or 
Special Counsel will not work in the vast majority of cases—it 
certainly will.67  But the cases where it is the least likely to be effective 
are arguably the cases where whistleblowing is the most important—
where government employees are involved in an illegal program that 
has approval from the most senior officials in the relevant agencies 
and departments. 
Largely with that tension in mind, Congress in 1998 enacted the 
Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act.68  The 
purpose of the Act could not have been more explicit; as one of the 
findings accompanying the Act states, “Congress, as a co-equal branch 
of Government, is empowered by the Constitution to serve as a check 
on the executive branch; in that capacity, it has a ‘need to know’ of 
allegations of wrongdoing within the executive branch, including 
allegations of wrongdoing in the Intelligence Community.”69
Thus, the ICWPA empowers certain employees of certain agencies 
to report either to Congress or to the Inspector General of the 
Department of Defense if it is a matter of “urgent concern,” 
including as here relevant: 
 (A) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or 
Executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding, 
administration, or operations of an intelligence activity involving 
 66. See, e.g., William Branigin, Inspector General Will Leave State Department, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 8, 2007, at A3; Glenn Kessler & Karen DeYoung, State IG Accused of 
Averting Probes, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2007, at A21. 
 67. See, e.g., Valerie Caproni, Symposium Transcripts, Panel:  The Role of 
Whistleblowers to Facilitate Government Accountability, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1244–47 (2008). 
 68. 5 U.S.C. app. § 8H (2000).  See generally Thomas Newcomb, In from the Cold:  
The Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1235 
(2001) (discussing the origins and legislative history of the ICWPA). 
 69. 5 U.S.C. app. § 8H (2000). 
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classified information, but does not include differences of opinions 
concerning public policy matters. 
 (B) A false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from 
Congress, on an issue of material fact relating to the funding, 
administration, or operation of an intelligence activity.70
But the ICWPA has its own limitations.  First, and most importantly, 
its central provisions appear to apply to employees of only four 
agencies—the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the 
NSA.71  The statute also provides procedures for Central Intelligence 
Agency (“CIA”) employees to report abuses and violations of the law 
to the CIA Inspector General,72 but that still leaves countless federal 
employees unprotected.73
Second, even in those cases where the ICWPA does apply, disclosure 
to the House and Senate intelligence committees may not accomplish 
anything.  As the controversy over the government’s waterboarding of 
various non-citizens detained as “enemy combatants” demonstrates, 
even when certain members of Congress are briefed on a classified—
and potentially unlawful—governmental program, they may not be 
legally entitled to act upon that information, at least publicly.74  As a 
result, even after the ICWPA, employees of various national security 
agencies have continued to call for further—and less convoluted—
whistleblower protections.75
The upside of the above analysis is fairly straightforward:  the 
various internal disclosure mechanisms will likely work in cases where 
 70. Id. § 8H(g)(1)(A)–(B). 
 71. See id. § 8H(a)(1)(A); see also Sasser, supra note 10, at 785 & n.152. 
 72. See generally 50 U.S.C. § 403q (Supp. IV 2004).  I thank Professor Lee for his 
clarification of this point. 
 73. The Military Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1034 (West 2008), 
confers similar protections upon active servicemembers. 
 74. See, e.g., Joby Warrick & Dan Eggen, Hill Briefed on Waterboarding in 2002, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2007, at A1.  The story suggests that one of the reasons the 
Democratic members briefed on the controversial interrogation techniques did not 
publicly reveal what they knew is that federal law prevented them from doing so.  My 
former colleague Michael Froomkin suggests, to the contrary, that the Constitution’s 
Speech and Debate Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1, would protect any 
member of Congress publicly revealing classified information on the floor of the 
House or Senate.  See Posting of Michael Froomkin to Discourse.net, Senators and 
Representatives Could Have Spoken Out on Waterboarding, http://www.discourse.net/ 
archives/2007/12/senators_and_representatives_could_have_spoken_out_on_water
boarding_the_constitution_protects_their_right_to_speak_out_without_fear_of_legal
_consequences.html (Dec. 9, 2007, 17:28 EST).  Regardless of who is actually correct, 
the mere fact that this is an open question suggests that disclosure to Congress—and 
to the intelligence committees, in particular—will not necessarily provide a remedy 
for the “unlawful secret” at issue. 
 75. See, e.g., Chris Strohm, Security Agency Whistleblowers Seek Stronger Protection, 
GOV. EXEC., Feb. 14, 2006, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0206/021406c1.htm. 
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individual (and fairly low-level) government officers are breaking the 
law.  But where a government employee is in possession of classified 
national security information about a potentially illegal governmental 
program approved at the highest levels of the federal government, 
the likelihood that disclosure pursuant to the WPA or ICWPA (to the 
extent they apply) will actually allow for meaningful oversight of the 
program is fleeting, at best. 
CONCLUSION 
As I noted above, my goal in this Essay is not to take a substantive 
position on whether it should ever be appropriate for a government 
employee in the possession of classified national security information 
to publicly disclose that information, especially to members of the 
news media.  I have my own views, but reasonable people can 
certainly disagree about the answer to this question. 
It is worth noting, however, that without national security 
whistleblowers, we would still be in the dark about various 
controversial aspects of the U.S. government’s conduct in the war on 
terrorism, including the wiretapping program, the “black sites,” the 
waterboarding of terrorism suspects, the abuses at Abu Ghraib, and 
so on.  If one believes that these disclosures have been a necessary 
and indispensable contribution to the ongoing debate, then the 
absence of protection for similar disclosures in the future under 
either the Constitution or federal statutory law should give all of us—
and not just the next government employee in the wrong place at the 
wrong time—serious cause for concern. 
 
